Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 42, Issue 1

Article 5

The Specter of a Generalissimo: The Original
Understanding of the President’s Defensive
War Powers
Jonathan G. D’Errico∗

∗

Copyright c by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

NOTE
THE SPECTER OF A GENERALISSIMO:
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
PRESIDENT’S DEFENSIVE WAR POWERS
Jonathan G. D’Errico *
ABSTRACT
The late twentieth century and early twenty-first century bore
witness to a flurry of small-scale conflicts, many of which were initiated
by the President of the United States without a formal declaration of
war from Congress. A host of legal scholars have decried these
hostilities and harshly admonished presidential initiative in warmaking. However, this state of affairs is not a modern phenomenon, but
rather a fate entirely anticipated by the Framers of the US Constitution.
By exploring a plethora of historical authorities and framing-era
sources, this Note distills an original understanding of the President’s
defensive war powers: the executive’s limited prerogative to
unilaterally repel an imminent foreign threat.
Before delving into the Framers’ understanding of constitutional
war powers, the plain language of the Constitution is scrutinized to
discern the basic division of war powers amongst Congress and the
President. Next, this Note examines the failures of the Articles of
Confederation, which forced the Framers to acknowledge the hazards
posed by a weak government unable to protect its national interests.
An investigation of debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787
reveals the Framers’ solution to these earlier shortcomings:
constraining the reach of Congress’ war powers so the President would
be free to swiftly rebuff imminent foreign aggression. This original
understanding is further clarified by the Federalist Papers, which not
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.M., 2013, New York
University. Thank you to my wife for her unwavering love and support, my family for their
continual encouragement, Dean John D. Feerick for his wisdom and inspiration, and the editors
and staff of the Fordham International Law Journal for their hard work and editing prowess.

153

154

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:1

only endorse presidential initiative in national defense but also
acknowledge Congress’ substantial power to temper extended
presidential war-making. After the Constitution was ratified, an
informal war with France led the newly-minted Supreme Court to
refine both the application of the President’s inherent defensive powers
and Congress’ role in sanctioning limited hostilities.
Finally, a comparative analysis with the eighteenth-century
British Constitution and the military authority of the British Crown—a
weighty foreign influence on the Framers—is employed to further
define the edges of the President’s original war powers. This
comparison highlights both the necessary strength of the President’s
defensive war powers while also acknowledging that such authority is
hardly a license for plenary military power or the royal prerogative for
war-making enjoyed by the eighteenth-century British Crown.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In summarizing the Constitution’s war powers, Justice
Frankfurter once remarked: “The war power is the war power.” 1 Four
years after this fine explanation, Justice Jackson apparently remained
perplexed over the President’s war powers, which he described as
“cryptic words” that have led to “some of the most persistent
controversies in our constitutional history.” 2 Over the course of the
Constitution’s nearly 230-year long history, Congress has formally
declared war only five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American
War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. 3
However, a 1966 report from the US State Department estimated that
the United States had deployed military forces into foreign hostilities
at least 125 times. 4 A modern evaluation from the Congressional
Research Service strikingly concluded that military forces have been
committed abroad over 200 times since our nation’s founding. 5
Many of these informal hostilities were small–scale conflicts
undertaken by the President to protect American citizens or property. 6
The President’s defensive power—the ability to unilaterally commit
military forces to rebuff foreign aggression—has become especially
pronounced with the establishment of a large standing army in the
twentieth century. 7 Indeed, the last seventy years have seen a torrent of
undeclared wars, many of which were initiated by the President without
congressional approval and certainly without a formal proclamation of
1. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
3. See Official Declarations of War by Congress, U. S. SENATE https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm
[https://perma.cc/8QZ8-7U73] (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). Of the eleven total declarations, six
pertain to World War II, and two pertain to World War I. See id.
4. See Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-nam, 54 DEP’T STATE BULL. 474, 484 (1966).
5. See generally BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738,
INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD (2017).
6. See W. Taylor Reveley III, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or
Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1257-58 (1969); Meeker supra note 4; see also TORREON,
supra note 5.
7. See Brendan Flynn, The War Powers Consultation Act: Keeping War out of the Zone
of Twilight, 64 CATH. U.L. REV. 1007, 1023-34 (2015); Patrick D. Robbins, The War Powers
Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 160-76 (1988)
(surveying presidential war-making and non-compliance with congressional regulation in the
late-twentieth century).
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war. 8 Some critics have argued that the President’s defensive power is
a tragic invention of the modern era, egged on by a degrading
adherence to the separation of powers. 9
However, the President’s defensive power is neither a twentiethcentury development nor the spawn of a floundering constitutional
system. As evidenced by a plethora of framing-era authorities, the
original understanding of the President’s war powers included the
limited authority to suppress an imminent foreign threat. 10 The
Constitution was designed to encourage presidential initiative in the
immediate defense of national borders while necessitating
congressional approval to sustain longer conflicts. 11 In cultivating this
original understanding of the Constitution’s war powers, this Note
addresses three critical pieces of history: (1) the flimsy Articles of
Confederation, (2) the debate over war powers at the Constitutional
Convention, and (3) the understanding and application of war powers
in the post-drafting era. To further reveal the contours of the President’s
original defensive war powers, a pervasive foreign influence is
introduced and compared—the eighteenth-century British Constitution
and the military authority of the British Crown. This comparison
illuminates the scope of the President’s defensive war powers and
showcases the capacious influence the British Crown had on the
Framers.
Part II inspects the plain language of the Constitution to sketch
the basic war powers framework. Part III advances an original
understanding of the President’s defensive war powers by consulting a
variety of framing-era sources. Specifically, Part III.A examines the
severe military deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and Part
III.B investigates how the Framers resolved these inadequacies at the
Constitutional Convention and originally conceived of the President’s
defensive power. Part III.C explores the endorsement of this inherent
8. See Robbins, supra note 7, at 162-76; see also John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics
by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 177-82
(1996). See Mark T. Uyeda, Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy U.S.
Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 781, 803-05 (1995); see also
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A “Joint Decision” Solution,
77 GEO. L.J. 367, 374-85 (1988).
9. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991); see also
generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
10. See infra Parts II and III.
11. See infra Parts II and III.
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executive authority in the Federalist Papers and subsequent refinement
in early Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part IV introduces the eighteenth-century British Crown’s war
powers as both a considerable influence on the Framers and a
comparative tool to contextualize the original understanding of the
President’s defensive war powers. Part IV.A details the British
Constitution’s historic division of war powers and Part IV.B analyzes
the scope of the President’s original defensive war powers alongside
the eighteenth-century military authority of the British Crown.
II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
Deciphering the “cryptic words” 12 that give rise to the President’s
defensive war powers requires delving into their foundation: the basic
text and structure of the Constitution. Articles I and II of the
Constitution largely divide war powers amongst Congress and the
President, while Article III circumscribes a more limited role for the
federal judiciary. 13 Article I provides Congress with a number of
explicitly enumerated war powers, such as the authority to “declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning
captures on land and water.” 14 Congress is also singularly empowered
to lay taxes to provide for the defense of the United States. 15 The list of
congressional war powers does not stop there. In addition to regulating
local militias16 and significant aspects of foreign affairs, 17 Congress is
also vested with the coveted “purse” power: the authority to raise and
support military forces via monetary appropriations. 18 The purse power
12. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
13. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-III. However, the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction can
certainly extend to controversies which implicate foreign affairs. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962) (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). But see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
589 (1952) (“[P]olicies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
15. See id. § 8, cl. 1.
16. See id. § 8, cl. 15-16. See also infra note 29 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 33 (regulating international commerce), cl. 4
(establishing immigration rules), cl. 10 (punishing piracy and maritime felonies).
18. Id. § 8, cl. 12-13.
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is an indispensable element of war—financial support is the lifeblood
of extended military affairs. 19
At first blush, the President’s Article II war powers may seem
somewhat meager in comparison to Congress’ formidable
enumerations. Although Article II unambiguously defines the President
as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States,” 20 the executive’s remaining war powers are more nebulous.
The Constitution vests the President with the murky “executive
Power” 21 and the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” 22 Finally, upon assuming office, the President is
constitutionally required to take an oath of office that instills a mandate
to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.” 23
The President’s role as national Commander in Chief, perhaps the
most famous of these enumerations, is an unqualified grant of
authority. 24 Although some provisions of the Constitution distinguish
between a “time of peace” 25 and a “time of war[,]” 26 the Commander
in Chief clause is not among them. 27 The President is always the United
States’ Commander in Chief, regardless of whether it is a time of
tranquility or battle. 28 Although the Constitution limits executive
control over state militias, 29 there are no temporal restrictions on the
President’s authority over the national military. 30 The Commander in

19. See infra notes 101-106 (describing the Framers’ appreciation of the incredible control
commanded by Congress’ purse power).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
21. Id. § 1, cl. 1.
22. Id. § 3.
23. Id. § 1, cl. 8.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from engaging in various
wartime measures during times of peace, provided there is no threat of imminent danger or
invasion).
26. See, e.g., id. amends. III (quartering soldiers), V (grand jury indictment); see also id.
art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended during times of
conflict).
27. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
28. See supra notes 25-27.
29. The President is only Commander in Chief of state militias when such forces are called
into service of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Only Congress can call forth
local militias. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
30. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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Chief clause ensures that the nation’s armed forces continually serve
under the President’s direction. 31
The “executive Power” clause is similarly exclusive—the entirety
of executive power is vested in the President, thereby creating a de jure
Chief Executive. 32 This executive power suffers few limits: it is
generally enumerated but not defined in its entirety. 33 Nothing
explicitly outlines or confines the President’s executive power. 34 In
contrast, Article I limits congressional authority to the “legislative
Powers herein granted.” 35 The inclusion of “herein” indicates that
Congress’ war powers are limited to the Constitution’s explicit
enumerations. 36 Although the President’s executive power is not
similarly confined by the constitutional text, it necessarily excludes
Congress’ explicitly enumerated war powers to effectuate the
separation of powers. 37 The President’s oath to protect and defend the
Constitution, as well as the responsibility to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed, further inform the bounds of the executive power.38
The Constitution does not prescribe these weighty duties on any other
organ of the federal government, implicating their importance as
matters of presidential discretion. 39 It follows that, as Chief Executive,
the President is uniquely empowered to enact policies outside
Congress’ purview which serve to protect and defend the Constitution
and ensure the laws are faithfully executed. 40 As discussed below in
Part III, the Framers understood that the gravitas of the President’s
exclusive duties as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief would
31. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668
(1862) (“The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power.”).
33. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138 (1926) (“The difficulty of a complete
enumeration of all the cases of executive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general
terms. . . .”).
34. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
36. See, e.g., supra notes 14-17; see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 138-39.
37. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The powers of the
President are not as particularized as are those of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not
mean undefined powers. The separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential
content to undefined provisions in the frame of our government.”); Springer v. Government of
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. § 3; see Myers, 272 U.S. at 138.
39. See supra notes 37-38.
40. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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become infinitely weightier when the United States is confronted with
an imminent foreign attack. 41
III. DISTILLING THE PRESIDENT’S DEFENSIVE POWER
Gleaning the original understanding of the Chief Executive’s
defensive power demands exploration of more than just the
Constitution’s text. Crucial moments in constitutional history must also
be examined: namely, the Articles of Confederation that governed
during and after the Revolutionary War, the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, and influential authorities from the post-drafting period. Part
III.A details the military deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation
and Part III.B inspects the Framers’ response to such failings when
drafting the Constitution in 1787. Finally, Part III.C analyzes two
preeminent sources of original understanding from the post-drafting
period: the Federalist Papers and early Supreme Court jurisprudence.
A. The Follies of the Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation were ratified in 1781 and governed
the United States for seven years before the Constitution became the
“law of the land.” 42 The Articles vested all federal power—legislative,
executive, and judicial—in a national assembly, the Continental
Congress. 43 The Continental Congress had “the sole and exclusive right
and power of determining on peace and war.” 44 This grant included the
singular authority to raise and support armed forces, make requisitions
from states to support the war effort, and enter into treaties or
alliances. 45 Many of these war powers required the assent of at least
nine states before they could be effectuated. 46 Individually, the states

41. See infra Part III.
42. OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/articles [https://perma.cc/73UV-H8UR] (last
visited Mar. 27, 2018).
43. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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were mostly barred from engaging in war absent congressional
consent. 47
The gross failures of this system informed the Framers’ intent and
goals when eventually crafting the Chief Executive’s war powers in the
Constitution. 48 Alexander Hamilton noted several “material defects”49
pertaining to war powers under the Articles, namely, the inability to
reclaim territories held by foreign powers, lack of adequate military
funding, and powerlessness to swiftly repel foreign aggression. 50
Hamilton asserted that the inability to coerce financial support in times
of public crisis was nothing short of a fatal flaw. 51 The Articles were
deemed “neither fit for war, nor peace.” 52 Hamilton’s avowals evidence
a desire for a fast-moving national government capable of rapidly
subordinating states when necessary to end a public crisis or rebuff
foreign invasion. 53
Hamilton’s vocal criticisms were supported by a chorus of fellow
Framers similarly frustrated with the lack of national security under the
Articles. 54 James Madison joined Hamilton in observing that “[t]he
small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time
of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local
prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate

47. See id. art. VI (prohibiting state war-making absent congressional authorization unless
the state was invaded or under threat of imminent attack). States could not maintain a navy or
standing army during peacetime without congressional consent. See id.
48. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 15-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). A
significant portion of the Federalist Papers—discussed infra Part III.C.1—are explicitly
dedicated to addressing the many “insufficiencies” and “defects” of the Articles. See generally
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15-17, 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 18-20 (Alexander Hamilton
and James Madison). Part III.A identifies the critiques most distinctly related to the Articles’
war powers.
50. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
(“[Under the Articles of Confederation,] [w]e have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.”). Hamilton explicitly referenced Spain’s exclusion of U.S. passage on the
Mississippi River as one such incident that caused the United States to nearly reach “the last
stage of national humiliation.” Id.
51. See id. (“[T]he evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial
imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.”).
52. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-0838 [https://perma.cc/26J9-2Z5E].
53. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
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contributions to the treasury.” 55 Edmund Randolph asserted that the
Articles “produced no security against foreign invasion; [the
Continental Congress] not being permitted to prevent a war nor to
support it by their own authority.” 56 Foreign aggression was an
insurmountably weighty burden under the Articles. 57
Many Framers recognized that a national legislature, by design,
was poorly equipped to handle threats to national security. 58 John Jay
argued that the central government needed a separate branch to engage
in “the executive business of sovereignty” for matters outside the reach
of a large national assembly, 59 which Jay viewed as inherently prone to
division and susceptible to foreign influence. 60 Robert Morris lamented
that he would be “[h]appy to experience a momentary relief from the
clamor and revolt of a starving army[] [and] from the rage and
devastation of an inveterate enemy. . . .” 61 Morris aptly characterized
the Continental Congress as “cumbrous” and “unwieldy”—for him,
like many others, the national legislature was incapable of speedily
delivering the necessary support “on which the salvation of country
depends.” 62 The Framers’ grievances about the Articles’ war powers
crystallized their intent when crafting the Constitution’s war powers:
they wanted a well-equipped, non-legislative branch of national
government that could swiftly repel foreign aggression and remain
unencumbered by both national and state actors. 63
B. Executive Power Reborn: The Constitutional Convention
The Constitutional Convention provided an opportunity for the
Framers to correct the vast shortcomings of the Articles. 64 Throughout
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 19, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
56. RICHARD J. ELLIS, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 161 (1999).
57. See sources cited supra notes 48-56.
58. See sources cited infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
59. See Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0427 [https://perma.cc/24FA-HCUP].
60. See id.
61. ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS, PATRIOT AND FINANCIER 125
(2012).
62. Id.
63. See notes supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
64. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter Farrand] (“[T]he articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected &
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely ‘common defence
[sic], security of liberty and general welfare.’”). This statement was made by Edmund Randolph
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the summer of 1787, delegates converged on Philadelphia with a wealth
of proposals concerning executive authority. 65 Despite hearing from a
number of sophisticated political minds—including Edmund
Randolph, James Wilson, William Paterson, and Hamilton—none of
these early proposals were adopted in their original form. 66 Promising
segments were sent to the Committee of Detail, a small group of
delegates charged with merging various proposals into a workable
constitutional draft. 67
The Committee of Detail’s early draft of the Constitution
provided Congress with the power to “make war.” 68 In subsequent floor
debate, Pierce Butler suggested that the power to “make war” should
be vested in the President, as political accountability could temper
executive discretion and thereby prevent egregious war-making.69
After Butler’s response, Madison and Elbridge Gerry immediately
moved “to insert ‘declare,’ striking out ‘make’ war; leaving to the
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.” 70 Rufus King supported
this change, noting that “‘make’ war might be understood to ‘conduct’
it which was an Executive function.” 71 The Madison-Gerry amendment
eventually prevailed in an 8-1 vote: Congress would only have the
power to “declare” war, not to “make” war. 72
This debate and subsequent amendment constitute the foundation
of the President’s defensive war powers: the Chief Executive’s military
but expressed a sentiment widely shared amongst the Framers. See, e.g., Letter from John Jay to
George Washington (Mar. 16, 1787), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/0403-02-0525 [https://perma.cc/TC9T-65BR] (“[A]n opinion begins to prevail that a general
convention for revising the articles of Confederation would be expedient.”); see also discussion
supra notes 49-63.
65. See, e.g., Farrand, supra note 64, at 20-23 (the “Virginia Plan”), 242-45 (the “New
Jersey Plan”), 291-92 (Hamilton’s proposal).
66. Randolph’s “Virginia Plan” envisioned a “National Executive” with the executive
rights previously enjoyed by the Continental Congress under the Articles. See id. at 226-27.
Paterson’s “New Jersey Plan” provided for a weak executive that would be elected and
controlled by Congress. See id. at 244. Finally, Hamilton championed an executive “governor”
who would possess many of the same war powers enjoyed by modern-day presidents. See id. at
291-92.
67. See id. at 127-28, 131-32.
68. See id. at 318-19.
69. See id. at 318.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 319.
72. Id. at 315. See also Yoo, supra note 8, at 264 (clarifying contradicting reports of
whether the Madison-Gerry amendment initially passed and concluding that, per Madison’s
notes, it initially passed by a vote of 7-2, and again by a vote of 8-1 after King’s argument).
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authority now encompassed “the power to repel sudden attacks” and to
directly oversee the resulting hostilities. 73 By explicitly carving this
power out from the auspices of Congress, 74 the Framers created a
limited realm of inherent executive authority which could not be
trespassed upon by the national legislature. 75 In doing so, the Framers
addressed major deficiencies under the Articles: no longer would a
cumbersome legislature be convened when a quick response was
needed; a solitary executive would swiftly act to repel an imminent
attack and protect national interests. 76 The limits of the President’s
defensive war powers were staked out: the Chief Executive could not
single-handedly usher the United States into full-blown war but could
engage the nation in more limited hostilities. 77
C. The Post-Drafting Years
The Framers’ support for the President’s defensive war powers
did not end with the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in
September 1787. 78 From October 1787 until August 1788, Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay anonymously published a collection of eighty-five
essays entitled the Federalist Papers. 79 These essays urged states to
ratify the new Constitution as the “safest course” to secure liberty,
dignity, and happiness for the new nation. 80 Today, these papers proffer
vital original interpretations of the Constitution from some of the most
prolific and influential Framers. 81 After the Constitution was ultimately
ratified, early Supreme Court jurisprudence critically developed the
war powers enumerated in the Constitution and refined the President’s
73. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
76. See supra Part III.A and notes 68-72.
77. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, Madison’s notes do not
clarify what type of “sudden attack” he thought would trigger the President’s defensive powers.
78. See discussion infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
79. See The Federalist Papers, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://crf-usa.org/foundations-ofour-constitution/the-federalist-papers.html [https://perma.cc/5F8T-9ZZD] (last visited Apr. 4,
2018).
80. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
Hamilton eloquently noted that “in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
proselytes by fire and sword.” Id. at 8.
81. Primary Documents in History, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/
bib/ourdocs/federalist.html#American [https://perma.cc/KH35-GMWD] (last visited Apr. 4,
2018).
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inherent defensive powers. Part III.C.1 details the Federalist Papers’
endorsements of the Chief Executive’s unilateral military authority and
its relation to Congress’ war powers. Part III.C.2 analyzes the Court’s
early interpretations of the President’s inherent defensive power and
Congress’ authority to sanction informal hostilities.
1. Convincing a Wary Nation: The Federalist Papers
The state debates over ratification bitterly divided the public—
many feared that their state’s rights would be swallowed up by the new
federal government, thereby reinstating a new cycle of tyranny. 82 In
persuading the skeptic public of the new Constitution’s merits and
assuaging fears of federal oppression, the Federalist Papers provided
invaluable articulations of presidential military authority and the
separation of war powers amongst Congress and the executive.83 One
of the foremost concerns underlying the Federalist Papers was
demonstrating the proposed government’s ability to protect the United
States. 84 In Federalist No. 41, Madison defined national security as “an
avowed and essential object of the American Union.” 85 But how best
to secure one of the most “primitive objects of civil society”? 86
Hamilton provided a fitting response in Federalist No. 74:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies
the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing
and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential
part in the definition of the executive authority. 87

82. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to General Washington (Oct. 30, 1787),
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-from-gov-morris-to-georgewashington/ [https://perma.cc/WXC2-HF58] (“I dread the cold and sour temper of the back
counties, and still more the wicked industry of those who have long habituated themselves to
live on the public, and cannot bear the idea of being removed from the power and profit of state
government. . . .”); see also Brutus, Essay X, (Jan. 24, 1788), http://teachingamerican
history.org/library/document/brutus-x/ [https://perma.cc/GDE9-RZGS] (arguing that states
should have exclusive control over local militias to offset the inherent danger of military
despotism posed by a large national standing army).
83. See discussion infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
84. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 207-08 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
85. Id. at 206-07.
86. Id. at 206.
87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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Presidential initiative was deemed necessary to shield the United
States from foreign attack. 88 Moreover, Hamilton identified the
President’s executive authority (or, as vested by Article II of the
Constitution, “executive Power” 89) as encompassing not only the
direction of military force, but also discretion in employing such
forces. 90 Hamilton hints that, as the lone Chief Executive, the President
should have the power to deploy military forces as deemed necessary
to further the “direction of war.” 91 Federalist No. 71 similarly endorsed
executive discretion: “it is certainly desirable that the Executive should
be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and
decision.” 92 In fact, robust presidential initiative was deemed “essential
to the protection of the community against foreign attacks” in
Federalist No. 70. 93 As recognized in Federalist No. 25, these foreign
threats could arise even absent a formal declaration of war. 94 For some
of the most prominent Framers, the President, as Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief, was constitutionally empowered to deploy and
control military forces to repel a foreign attack, irrespective of whether
there was a formal state of hostilities. 95 Presidential discretion was a
felt necessity during times of war. 96 The Federalist Papers’ support of
unilateral executive military authority shined a much-needed light upon
the cloudy waters of the President’s constitutional war powers. 97

88. See id. (“The propriety of [the Article II Commander in Chief clause] . . . is so evident
in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in
general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.”).
89. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
90. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
91. See id.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). See
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“That unity
is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch [sic] will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number . . . .”).
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . [and] to the security of
liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”).
94. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 126 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“[T]he ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse . . . .”).
95. See discussion supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
96. See discussion supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
97. See discussion supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.

2018]

THE SPECTER OF A GENERALISSIMO

167

Many antifederalists were troubled by the President’s proposed
control over the military and feared that such authority would enable
despotism. 98 In response, the Federalist Papers emphasized that the
separation of vital war powers amongst Congress and the President
would prevent federal tyranny. 99 While describing this divided
authority in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton contended that the President
“holds the sword of the community” while Congress “commands the
purse.” 100 In Federalist No. 58, Madison unabashedly defined
Congress’ purse power as a “powerful instrument” that is the “most
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people.” 101 Without Congress’
financial support, the executive’s extended military efforts are
hamstrung. 102 Sustained military engagements are impossible to
maintain absent congressional appropriations and taxes. 103 Thus,
congressional control over military funding, and the associated power
to raise and regulate wartime forces, 104 serve as the ultimate check on
executive war-making. 105 After all, as proclaimed in Federalist No. 51,
the legislature is the predominate branch of the federal government—
not the executive. 106
Madison also acknowledged in Federalist No. 51 that no arm of
the federal government could exist without some form of check on its
power. 107 Federalist No. 69 asserted that, in addition to the purse
power, Congress’ exclusive license to call upon state militias acted as
98. See, e.g., Philadelphiensis, Essay IX, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER (Feb. 6, 1788),
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/philadelphiensis-ix/
[https://perma.cc/
XLJ9-TUE2] (“Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes,
and one of the most dangerous kind too; a king elected to command a standing army? Thus our
laws are to be administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of
the executive department is put in his hands.”). See also An Old Whig, Essay V, PHILA. INDEP.
GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/an-old-whig-v/
[https://perma.cc/5PXZ-8YPV].
99. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying discussion.
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 298 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
102. See id. at 297 (“The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can
propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government.”).
103. See supra notes 15, 18-19 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 100-104.
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“In
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”).
107. See id. at 264-66.
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a significant limitation on executive military action. 108 However,
control over the national military is not among the war powers divided
between Congress and the President. 109 In addition, Congress does not
enjoy any of the President’s “executive Power,” 110 which, per several
of the Federalist Papers, could encompass the unilateral deployment of
military forces to quickly rebuff foreign aggression. 111 These essays
also recognized that this defensive power would be most effectively
employed by a lone Chief Executive, rather than a national
legislature. 112 Although the Federalist Papers indicated that Congress
can utilize their control over local militias and purse power to temper
and even terminate presidential war-making, 113 they also
acknowledged that the power and discretion to quickly repel a foreign
attack is firmly rooted in executive prerogative. 114
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Federalist Papers were ultimately successful in their mission:
after a “long and arduous” journey, the Constitution became “the
official governing document of the United States” on June 21, 1788.115
However, the post-ratification years would not be a quiet period of
nation-building. 116 Conflicts with Native Americans and a naval war
with France quickly followed the Constitution’s ratification.117
Consequently, litigation concerning federal war powers and
presidential authority wove its way into some of the Supreme Court’s
earliest dockets. 118 As the newly-minted authoritative interpreters of
the Constitution, 119 the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from the post108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 349-50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
109. See id.
110. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 87-94.
112. See supra notes 109-111.
113. See supra notes 100-106.
114. See supra notes 86-97.
115. The day the Constitution was ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21, 2018),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified.
116. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 91-127 (1975); see also
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-1801, at 90-105 (1966).
117. See sources supra note 116.
118. See discussion infra notes 121-166 and accompanying text.
119. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166-67 (1803).
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ratification period crucially molded the original understanding of the
President’s unilateral war powers. 120
Chief Justice John Marshall critically sculpted the fiber of the
presidency in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison. 121 Marshall
recognized that the President is vested with “certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion.” 122 For
such matters, the President is “accountable only to his country in his
political character” and, of course, “to his own conscience.” 123 While
simultaneously recognizing the federal judiciary’s power of supreme
review, 124 Marshall also observed that some presidential actions are
necessarily outside the purview of Article III courts. 125 The Court
found that policy determinations, which are constitutionally committed
to the President, are ripe for political questions. 126 The constitutional
grants underlying the President’s war powers—namely, the
“Commander in Chief” and “executive Power” clauses 127—are prime
contenders for such “important political powers” 128 that are to be
exercised solely at the President’s discretion. 129 No other federal
branch can ever assume the title of “Commander in Chief” or enjoy any
of the President’s “executive Power.” 130 As described above, formative
Framers understood these exclusive constitutional grants as giving rise
to the defensive power to repel imminent foreign attacks. 131 Thus,
Marshall’s holding implies that the President’s exclusive defensive
power is a matter of executive discretion and outside the scrutiny of the
federal judiciary—it remains answerable only to the political virtues of
the American people and the fortitude of the executive’s conscience.132
120. See discussion infra notes 121-166 and accompanying text.
121. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
122. Id. at 165-66.
123. Id. at 166.
124. See id. at 166-67.
125. See id. at 170.
126. See id. (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”). Marshall provided several
examples of political questions in Marbury: the President’s appointment and nomination
powers, as well as the President’s power to grant commissions. Id. at 155-56, 166-67; see also
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2-3.
127. See discussion supra notes 20-21, 26-32.
128. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165.
129. See id. at 155-56, 166-67.
130. See sources supra notes 20-21, 26-32.
131. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C.1.
132. See discussion supra notes 121-131.
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In the years directly preceding Marbury, a trio of cases concerning
naval hostilities with France clarified Congress’ authority to sanction
informal military affairs. 133 First, in the 1800 case Bas v. Tingy,134 a
dispute over salvage rights prompted the Court to consider whether a
congressional declaration of war was necessary to formalize
engagement in hostilities. 135 Even though war was not “declared in
form,” 136 the Court found that Congress had authorized an “imperfect
war” 137 that was “limited as to places, persons, and things” 138 by
enacting a general law regulating the recapture of ships from the
“enemy” 139 and additional legislation clearly indicating that France
was the intended “enemy” referenced in the recapture statute.140 In
recognizing the practical effect of this antagonistic legislation, the
Court held that “war may exist without a declaration” and that “a
defensive war requires no declaration.” 141 A year later, the Court’s
decision in Talbot v. Seeman 142 again confirmed that Congress could
authorize a “partial” war of limited breadth against France without a
formal declaration. 143 These cases unambiguously stand for the
proposition that a declaration of war is not required to engage in
hostilities; Congress may authorize a war that is “imperfect” or
“solemn,” 144 the scope of military campaigns may be “general” and
sweeping or “partial” and limited. 145 A formal pronouncement is not
required to baptize hostilities. 146
133. See discussion infra notes 134-155 and accompanying text.
134. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
135. See id. at 40, 43.
136. Id. at 40.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 39.
140. Id. at 41 (“[C]ongress had raised an army; stopped all intercourse with France;
dissolved our treaty; built and equipt [sic] ships of war; and commissioned private armed
ships . . . to defend themselves against the armed ships of France . . . and to re-capture armed
vessels found in their possession.”).
141. Id. at 37.
142. 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
143. Id. at 28 (“[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general
laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as
they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.”). The Court explicitly drew upon their
holding in Bas v. Tingy in arriving at this conclusion. Id. at 9.
144. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 40.
145. See Talbot, 5 U.S. at 8.
146. See id.; Bas, 4 U.S. at 40.
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Finishing the trio of cases is Little v. Barreme, 147 wherein the
Court held a naval officer personally liable for following a presidential
order that went beyond Congress’ authorization for limited sea captures
in the unofficial war with France. 148 Much like the preceding
controversies in Bas and Tingy, Little is centered upon the legal effect
of war once it has already commenced, not the power of actually going
to war. 149 The focal point of these cases is not inherent war powers, but
rather legislation arising from Congress’ authority to “make Rules
concerning Captures on . . . Water.” 150 The Court’s jurisdiction is
derived from its power to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction” 151—not the President’s or Congress’ constitutional power
to initiate hostilities. By focusing on Congress’ statute providing for
limited captures, the Court avoided directly assessing constitutional
war powers and sidestepped a political question. 152 Moreover, even
when holding a naval officer personally liable for following a
presidential war order, the Court refrained from enjoining enforcement
of the President’s original military command. 153 Marshall intentionally
left the issue of the President’s inherent war powers open:
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose
high duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”
and who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of the
United States, might not, without any special authority for that
purpose, in the then existing state of things, have empowered the
officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to
seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which
were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce. 154
147. 6 U.S. 170 (1804).
148. See id. at 178-79.
149. See id. at 176-78; Talbot, 5 U.S. at 27-29; Bas, 4 U.S. at 40-42.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
151. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
152. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.; Little, 6 U.S. at 177-79; see also J.
Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters of Marque and
Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 483 (2005)
(“Bas was a case of statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation.”); Yoo, supra note
8, at 294 (“Rather than making grand pronouncements on the separation of powers, cases such
as Bas, Talbot, and Little underscored Congress’ role in deciding on the legal state of relations
with a hostile nation.”); sources supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text. Professor Yoo
aptly noted that “[n]either Bas, Talbot, nor Little (nor all three added together) constituted the
Marbury of foreign relations law.” Yoo, supra note 8, at 294.
153. See Little, 6 U.S. at 179.
154. Id. at 177.
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The President’s inherent war powers, and the executive’s authority to
venture beyond congressional authorization, remain untouched by
Little. 155
Judicial recognition of the President’s defensive war powers came
at the twilight of the framing era. The 1827 case Martin v. Mott 156 arose
from a militiaman’s refusal to answer a President’s call to service after
the militiaman deemed the emergency insufficient to justify the use of
the militia. 157 In an unanimous decision, the Court held that, under the
Militia Act of 1795 (“Militia Act”), the President is “the judge of the
existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act
according to his belief of the facts.” 158 As such, the Court held that the
President was vested with the exclusive authority to declare an
emergency. 159 The determination of a state of emergency was
necessarily conclusive upon all subordinate officers 160 and mandated
an appropriate military response to suppress the imminent threat.161
However, the Court found that this authority to rebuff foreign
aggression did not derive solely from the Militia Act, but also from the
“nature of the power itself” 162:
If we look at the language of . . . [the Militia Act], every conclusion
drawn from the nature of the power itself, is strongly fortified. The
words are, “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in
imminent danger of invasion, &c. [sic] it shall be lawful for the
President, &c [sic] to call forth such number of the militia, &c [sic]
as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion.” The power itself
is confided to the Executive of the Union, to him who is, by the
constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia, when called
into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty it is to
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose

155. See id. at 177-79.
156. 25 U.S. 19 (1827).
157. See id. at 28.
158. Id. at 31.
159 See id.
160. Id. at 31-32.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 30 (“We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other
persons. We think that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself,
and from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Congress.”).
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responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is
secured by the highest sanctions. 163

Notwithstanding the Militia Act, the Court suggests that the
President’s constitutional roles as Chief Executive and Commander in
Chief provide independent authority to repel foreign attacks. 164 The
inherent defensive power could only be exercised in true exigencies:
“upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under
circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union.”165
The close of the framing era brought with it an implicit recognition of
the President’s limited constitutional authority to repel foreign
invasions and the narrow circumstances that justify the exercise of such
power. 166
The failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide for even
basic national protection offered a cautionary tale of the dangers posed
by a feeble federal government. 167 The Framers heeded these warnings
when drafting the Constitution and explicitly created a Commander in
Chief who could unilaterally repel foreign aggression, 168 yet remained
sufficiently tethered to congressional purse strings to prevent hostilities
outside the interests of the people. 169 Leading Framers advocated for
an “energetic” 170 Chief Executive empowered to rebuff sudden
attacks171 while soothing fears that the Constitution would enable
federal tyranny. 172 Finally, the Supreme Court recognized the
boundaries of the President’s defensive power: even in an era of
“imperfect” wars and “partial” conflicts, 173 only “sudden emergencies”
and “great occasions of state” triggered the executive’s inherent

163. Id. at 31. Michael Bahar, former Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security
Council, pinpointed the same language in Martin to similarly conclude that the President
possesses inherent constitutional authority to repel foreign attacks. See Michael Bahar, The
Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the
Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 553-54 (2014).
164. See Martin, 25 U.S. at 31.
165. Id. at 30.
166. See discussion supra notes 156-165.
167. See supra notes 50, 54-62 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 17-19, 99-105 and accompanying text.
170. See sources supra notes 92-93.
171. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 134-146 and accompanying text.
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defensive power. 174 Even if likely outside the judiciary’s purview, the
presidential defensive power would be held accountable by the scrutiny
of the American people, further tempering the Chief Executive’s
discretion. 175 Constitutionally charged with a robust mandate to protect
national borders, the institution of the President was designed to
speedily rebuff foreign aggression, with a wary Congress guiding the
tiller for the journey ahead.
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC
The Framers did not create the Constitution in a vacuum—as
former English colonists, the British Constitution loomed over nearly
every aspect of their pre-revolution lives. 176 Even when the Framers
shed the shackles of British rule, they did not abandon the treasure trove
of political knowledge embedded in the British Constitution.177
Familiar terms such as “Commander in Chief,” “executive Power,” and
“declare War” were sown from the bedrock of the British
Constitution. 178 As such, the original understanding of the President’s
defensive war powers can be further illuminated by comparing its
contours with the contemporaneous military authority of the British
Commander in Chief—the royal Crown. 179 Part IV.A describes the
division of war powers in the eighteenth-century British Constitution
and Part IV.B juxtaposes royal war powers with the President’s
defensive military authority.
A. The British Crown’s Royal Prerogative
While the American executive’s war powers are founded in a
written constitution, the British Crown’s military authority stems from

174. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827).
175. See supra notes 121-131 and accompanying text.
176. See M.E. Bradford, The Best Constitution in Existence: The Influence of the British
Example on the Framers of Our Fundamental Law, 27 BYU STUD. Q. 51, 58-64 (1987); see
generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967) (masterfully detailing the colonists’ intellectual determinism to reclaim crucial liberties
from their British overseers).
177. See Bradford, supra note 176, at 63 (“If there is one constant in the political discourse
of eighteenth-century Americans it, is a generous and undeviating admiration for the British
constitution as they knew it.”).
178. See discussion infra notes 186-193.
179. See infra Part IV.B for this comparative analysis.
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the unwritten principles of the British Constitution. 180 The British
Constitution is not a single document, but rather an abstract set of
practices, common law jurisprudence, and conventions that evolve over
time. 181 In a similar vein to the American Constitution, the eighteenthcentury British Constitution apportioned military powers between
Parliament and the Crown. 182 Britain survived near-continuous warfare
from the mid-seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth
century, 183 which heavily influenced and dictated the division of war
powers between the Crown and Parliament. 184
Renowned jurist William Blackstone masterfully articulated the
division of war powers within the eighteenth-century British
Constitution in his seminal Commentaries on the Laws of England. 185
Blackstone powerfully described the Crown as a “generalissimo” that
supremely reigned over all British military forces. 186 The British
generalissimo’s royal prerogative included the exclusive authority to
raise, regulate, and command all manner of military forces—armies,
fleets, forts, and any “places of strength.” 187 All military installations
were subject to the Crown’s approval. 188 The Crown’s mighty domestic
power was even more pronounced abroad: the Crown was a binding
and necessary element for all foreign matters. 189 This sweeping
180. See Robert Blackburn, Britain’s Unwritten Constitution, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution [https://perma.cc/8G9EDXDG]; see also Yoo, supra note 8, at 198.
181. See Blackburn, supra note 180.
182. Yoo, supra note 8, at 198.
183. See id. at 212 (observing that Britain was engaged in war from “1665-67 (Second
Anglo-Dutch War), 1672-74 (Third Anglo-Dutch War), 1689-97 (War of the Grand Alliance),
1702-13 (War of the Spanish Succession), 1718-20 (War of the Quadruple Alliance), 1739-48
(War of the Austrian Succession), 1754-63 (Seven Years’ War), 1775-83 (the American
Revolution), and 1793-1801 (War with revolutionary France)”).
184. See id. at 198.
185. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230-70. See also Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1996) (discussing the impact
of Blackstone’s tremendous recapitulation of British common law that, at the time, was arguably
unparalleled in its clarity, breadth, and structure).
186. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262. Blackstone’s spelling and
grammar has been modernized for the purposes of this Note.
187. Id. at *262-63.
188. See id.
189. See id. at *252 (“What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers,
is the act of the whole nation; what is done without the king’s concurrence is the act only of
private men.”). The Crown also had the sole power of treaty-making, as well as sending and
receiving ambassadors. Id. at *257, *253.

176

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:1

authority included the singular prerogative of declaring war and
peace. 190 For all matters, it was impossible for the Crown to do any
wrong. 191 The Crown remained “inferior to no man” and “accountable
to no man.” 192 The Crown’s military decisions were utterly outside the
realm of public scrutiny. 193
Despite ascribing the Crown with absolute perfection,194
Blackstone was not immune to notions of divided authority and
separation of powers. 195 Blackstone incorporated theories from fellow
enlightenment thinkers John Locke 196 and Montesquieu 197 when
articulating the limits of the Crown’s power and the role of Parliament
in the British Constitution. 198 For instance, only Parliament could
authorize the levying of taxes, a necessary element of maintaining and
outfitting military forces. 199 The Crown could raise military forces but
needed Parliament’s financial support to sustain them. 200 Parliament
could thus voice their support (or lack thereof) for hostilities by
tailoring their level of financial support for the conflict. 201
Beyond the purse power, Parliament could promulgate any
domestic law that did not diminish or interfere with the Crown’s
authority. 202 The Crown’s near-plenary power was “created for the
benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their
prejudice.” 203 As such, Parliament retained the power to impeach the
190. Id. at *257. Officers of the Crown could issue letters of marque and reprisal when
quick action was needed, however, this could only result in an “incomplete state of hostilities.”
Id. at *258.
191. See id. at *246-47.
192. Id. at *242.
193. See sources supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
194. See sources supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
195 See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *122, *243, *252
(acknowledging and incorporating Locke’s theories by explicit reference).
197. Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the
American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1990).
198. See discussion infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
199. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160-62.
200. See id.; see also JEREMY BLACK, A SYSTEM OF AMBITION?: BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY 1660-1793, at 18-19 (1991) (detailing Parliament’s role as a financier and the control
associated with this financial power); J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 72
(1821) (“The King of England . . . has the prerogative of commanding armies, and equipping
fleets—but without the concurrence of his Parliament he cannot maintain them.”).
201. See supra notes 199-200.
202. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246-47.
203. Id. at *246.
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Crown’s ministers for taking part in “improper or inglorious conduct”
when engaging in war-making pursuant to the generalissimo’s royal
prerogative. 204 Thus, the eighteenth-century Crown’s war-making was
subject to two legislative checks: Parliament’s purse power and limited
impeachment power. 205 All other military functions—raising troops,
declaring war, regulating armies, commanding forces, concluding
hostilities—were exclusively matters of royal prerogative. 206
B. The Edges of the Defensive Power: Comparing Two Commanders
in Chief
It is no coincidence that the Framers’ system of constitutional
checks and balances created an executive whose war powers, on the
whole, paled in comparison to the eighteenth-century British Crown’s
dominion over the military. 207 The abuses of the British Crown and
royal army remained painfully fresh memories for many former
colonists long after the Revolutionary War. 208 Hamilton explicitly
noted the differences between the two executives in Federalist No. 69:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States. In this respect his authority would be
nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that
of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the
RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
legislature. 209
204. Id. at *258. The Crown’s treaty-making was subject to the same “constitutional
check” of ministerial impeachment. Id. at *257.
205. See supra notes 198-204.
206. See supra notes 185-192.
207. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2005-09 (1999) (detailing how the
British Crown incrementally tightened its vice on the American colonists’ right to self-assembly
and self-government in the years leading up to the American Revolution).
208. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3-30 (U.S. 1776) (listing
twenty-seven specific transgressions by the British Crown that amounted to “absolute tyranny”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 193 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“If the plan of the
convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must
abandon it as no longer defensible.”); see generally BAILYN, supra note 176.
209. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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Hamilton described the President as a second-rate king.210
Perhaps in an intentional effort to inflate the British Crown’s war
powers and soothe the fears of antifederalists, Hamilton ignored
Parliament’s funding powers and limited impeachment authority as
critical checks on the Crown’s war-making. 211 However, Hamilton
appropriately noted that a President could not formally sanction
hostilities in the same manner as a British Crown—the President has
no constitutional authority to declare war. 212 Hamilton also recognized
the contrast between the President’s limited control over local militias
and the British generalissimo’s unrestrained command of all military
forces as a core difference amongst the two executives. 213 Generally
speaking, Hamilton correctly analogized the relationship between the
President’s more limited war powers and the British Crown’s extensive
military authority, especially for longer, formalized conflicts.
But what of the limited instances where a President faces “sudden
emergencies,” “great occasions of state,” or “circumstances which may
be vital to the existence of the Union”? 214 As a matter of necessity, the
President’s war powers swell during such tumultuous times to fend off
foreign aggression. 215 When faced with an imminent foreign attack, the
President’s military authority briefly shares some of the eighteenthcentury British Crown’s power: Congress’ “declare war” power is
negligible as the President determines the appropriate military
response, the control of the legislature’s purse power stills for a fleeting
moment, and a more limited accountability reigns for the Chief
Executive’s actions.
By holding that “a defensive war requires no declaration,” 216 the
Supreme Court recognized that the imminency of a sudden military
crisis may render a formal declaration of war infeasible. 217 The Framers
understood that the President’s constitutional responsibilities as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive would prevail in such
circumstances and enable the limited deployment of US military forces

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id. at 349-51.
See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
See id.
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827).
See supra Parts III.B, III.C.
Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 37 (1800).
See id.
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to suppress the incoming threat. 218 As the singular Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief of the United States’ military forces, 219 the
President exclusively determines the military response needed to
suppress the imminent foreign threat. 220 For a brief moment, Congress’
power to declare war is of little importance as the President alone
decides how best to respond to the exigency. In this small defensive
window, similarities with the British Crown bubble to the surface. The
eighteenth-century British Crown alone decided the level of force
mandated by an international conflict. 221 As was often the case with the
British Crown’s orders, this immediate decision was conclusive and
unchallengeable. 222 Although the President lacks the British Crown’s
authority to bind the entire nation to war, both the British Crown and
the President were the sole decision-makers when evaluating and
committing an appropriate military response to rebuff imminent
foreign aggression.
Both Congress and Parliament could not exercise their funding
powers to intervene during this narrow response window. Although
Congress has significant latitude to sanction or proscribe any manner
of hostilities, 223 the Framers believed a President’s initial rebuff of
foreign aggression to be outside the realm of congressional control.224
Similarly, Parliament’s purse strings could not temper the British
Crown’s initial decision to commit military forces into hostilities.225
Only after the chief executives had responded to the imminent threat
could the national legislatures employ their weighty purse powers to
control the duration and intensity of the hostilities. 226 When faced with
an imminent foreign threat, presidential military authority briefly
surges above the reach of Congress’ purse power and, for a moment,
shares a plateau with the British Crown. 227

218. See supra notes 68-77, 87-97, 156-166 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 26-41, 89-95, 156-166 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text. See infra notes 228-232 and
accompanying text for an analysis comparing the President’s and British Crown’s political
accountability.
223. See supra notes 98-106, 133-146 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 70-72, 87-93 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
226. See sources supra notes 223-225.
227. See sources supra notes 223-226.
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Congress does not stand alone as the sole federal branch affected
by this executive authority—the judiciary also falls under the shadow
of the Chief Executive’s defensive power. The judiciary is very likely
barred from scrutinizing the President’s defensive power because it is
a policy decision founded upon constitutional grants exclusively vested
in the President and thus constitutes a nonjusticiable political
determination. 228 Absent judicial inquiry, the President faces limited
accountability for committing military forces to repel a pressing
foreign threat—the Chief Executive remains answerable only to the
political character of the American people and self-morality. 229 The
President’s limited accountability was also shared by the eighteenthcentury British Crown, albeit on a much greater scale. 230 Royal
prerogative ensured that the Crown’s military decisions could not be
directly questioned. 231 Beyond the purse power, the most Parliament
could do to voice their discontent with the Crown’s war-making was to
impeach his ministers—absent a revolution, the Crown could never be
held personally accountable for its actions. 232 Although the President
never reaches such perilous heights of political immunity, both chief
executives enjoyed limited accountability when rebuffing foreign
aggression.
The President’s military authority never summits the peaks
reached by the eighteenth-century British Crown. However, the
distance between the two chief executives is certainly narrowed when
the President’s defensive powers are triggered by national exigency.
An impending foreign attack activates a surge of presidential authority
to quell the immediate hostilities: the President is free to craft an
appropriate military response absent formal congressional
authorization or interference. The defensive power of the American
Commander in Chief is momentarily untethered from congressional
purse strings and only subject to limited accountability via the political
virtues of the American people. The British Commander in Chief was
no stranger to these privileges, as the Crown freely responded to
hostilities and could initially commit military forces unburdened by
Parliament’s powers. Despite several core differences—such as the
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-194, 202-205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-194, 202-205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
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Crown’s supreme political immunity—the President’s defensive power
stands closer to the eighteenth-century British Crown’s military
authority than Hamilton, or his fellow federalists, may have felt
comfortable admitting to a leery public. 233
V. CONCLUSION
An original understanding of the Constitution would necessarily
be incomplete without recognition of the President’s defensive war
powers. The failures of the Articles of Confederation informed the
Framers of the peril posed by a weak government unable to secure its
borders or protect its national interests. In response, the Framers
fashioned a Chief Executive exclusively empowered to lead the
nation’s armed forces as Commander in Chief. This inherent
constitutional authority was designed to serve as a national aegis and
swiftly rebuff foreign threats. The Framers wanted a true “sword of the
community” 234: a vigorous and energetic Commander in Chief unafraid
to repel a hostile onslaught.
Although the awakening of the President’s inherent defensive
authority momentarily quiets Congress’ war powers, the Framers
ensured this hush does not last for long. Outside immediate exercises
of the President’s defensive power, the Framers intended Congress to
guide the “sword of the community” by either funding or frustrating
war. Congress’ critical limitations on executive authority ensure that
the President’s war powers could never subsume the tall shadow cast
by the eighteenth-century British Crown. The original understanding
of the defensive power reveals formidable authority, but, as evidenced
by comparison with the British Crown, it is hardly a license for plenary
military power or a royal prerogative for war-making. The “cryptic
words” 235 underlying the President’s constitutional war powers have
been further confounded by a modern history of informal war-making
and executive boundary-pushing. Delving into the original
understanding of such powers cuts through the quagmire: the Framers’
design ensures that the President’s defensive war powers only manifest
the specter of a generalissimo, even during the most trying of times.

233. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
234. See.THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
235. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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